reached a consensus that environmental protection and economic development must be partners to achieve the common goal of environmentally sustainable development.' Economic competitiveness must take place within the framework dictated by this common goal. 2 Sustainable development implies that future generations have as much right as the present generation to a robust environment with which to meet their own needs and preferences. Elsewhere I have argued that we hold the environment in common with all generations-past, present, and future.
The notion that future generations have rights to inherit a robust environment provides a solid normative underpinning for the idea of environmentally sustainable development. 4 In its absence, sustainable development might depend entirely on a sense of noblesse oblige of the present generation. Intergenerational rights require environmentally sustainable development by the present generation.
Environmental regulation must therefore be viewed from a long-term perspective. The same is true of competitiveness, since nations and firms may be tempted to pay a heavy price in environmental degradation in order to compete for economic gain. For this reason, competitiveness among countries is not simply a short-term economic issue, but rather an intergenerational one. 5 Future generations may have to pay more for the same goods and services that we receive today because of the increasing funds that must be allocated to cover interest on the national debt. Similarly, if a country degrades its environment or otherwise fails to maintain environmental robustness, it may impose large remedial costs on future generations which will divert resources from other investments and activities. Moreover, contemporary environmental degradation may reduce the natural resource options available to future generations to satisfy their demands, such as by limiting the uses of lakes, rivers and forests. In these ways, today's environmental damage may affect tomorrow's competitiveness. 7 Sustainable competitiveness, which combines the interests that underlie sustainable development and international competitiveness, puts environmental protection and methods that facilitate economic growth under a common umbrella. If nations adopt sustainable competitiveness as the appropriate context for considering the relation between environmental regulations and competitiveness, several important points in response to Professor Stewart's article emerge.
First, sustainable competitiveness means that environmental protection is not an amenity, or luxury good, 8 to be indulged in after a country has 4 . For further analysis of this issue, see Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Perspectives on Time Comparisons: An Evaluation of Tne Discounting, in GLOBAL ACCORD 307 (Nazli Choucri ed., forthcoming 1993) and Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity: Toward an International Legal Framework, in id. at 333. 5. Robert Reich has defined American competitiveness as "the capacity of Americans to add value to the world economy and thereby gain a higher standard of living in the future without going into ever deeper debt." Robert B. Reich, Who is Us?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 53, 59 . For a concise analysis of national competitiveness, see Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 73, 84-85. 6. See U.S. Budget for Fiscal Year 1993, pt. 3, ch. 26 , at 1, 12-13 (on file with author). See generally [Vol. 102: 2123 Environmental Regulation achieved a given level of economic development. Nor is the environment appropriately viewed only in the context of comparative assimilative capacity. 9 Rather, sustainable competitiveness limits the extent to which we can treat environmental conditions as a factor of comparative advantage or as a luxury good. Certain kinds of environmental protection must accompany economic development if competitiveness is to be environmentally sustainable.' 0 Actions in pursuit of competitiveness today must be conceived so that we do not borrow from our children and our grandchildren a debt we cannot repay. Second, Professor Stewart recommends "international harmonization" of standards through international agreements to address transboundary externalities" but is skeptical about harmonizing other national environmental standards, largely because of different environmental assimilative capacities among countries. In certain circumstances, however, it is important to develop internationally agreed-upon minimum standards among countries for measures that affect environmentally sustainable development, and these should then serve as a basis for competitive behavior among firms. This applies to transboundary environmental impacts, including those affecting the global commons, as noted by Stewart, but in addition to certain environmental impacts within national borders. At the level of the firm, sustainable competitiveness means concern for the whole life cycle of the production process and the internalization of the full costs of production, as expressed in the polluter pays principle.
Third, as Stewart argues, market-based incentives are promising environmental policy instruments, but, as Stewart does not discuss, they are largely untested. It is important to ensure that such instruments be designed to support the goal of environmentally sustainable development, that the interests of future generations be considered, and that experience with them be carefully monitored and evaluated.
This Comment explores each of these three issues in turn.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS CENTRAL TO COMPETITIVENESS
The chief obstacle to considering competitiveness and environmental regulation in the intergenerational context is the view raised by Professor Stewart that the environment is an amenity-a luxury for which there is significant demand only when basic needs have been satisfied, and hence an economic good which can be traded off against other economic goods.' 2 Lawrence Summers, former chief economist of the World Bank, outlined this view in his memorandum circulated in the World Bank) 3 From this perspective, it is more efficient for some countries to host dirty industries than for others, a factor which Stewart refers to as comparative assimilative capacity.' 4 Stewart implicitly endorses this viewpoint. 5 Under this view, industries should migrate to areas with clean air, water, or soils, or with the least stringent environmental regulations. The Summers memo provocatively explored the economic rationale for the migration of "dirty" industries to developing countries. 6 One can legitimately argue that a country today should be able to develop in ways that may not be the most environmentally sound provided that the damage can be repaired at acceptable costs later. While people would pay the costs of environmental degradation now, they would in theory generate the wealth to be able to repair it later. Crucial to this argument is the assumption that environmental damage is not permanent: that it can always be repaired later, presumably by investing the fruits of the economic growth achieved by accepting a temporary burden of pollution. Some economic studies have suggested that the empirical relationship between environment and development is an inverted U-shaped curve, in which countries pollute the environment up to the point at which they have become sufficiently industrialized that they can indulge their concern for protecting the environment.17
Some long-term environmental damage, however, cannot be repaired over a period of one or even a few generations. Ozone depletion, loss of biological diversity, contamination of soils by hazardous, toxic or nuclear wastes, and pollution of lake bottoms and ground water aquifers are either irreversible or reversible at unacceptably high costs.'" Moreover, they affect the robustness of our ecosystems and the integrity of our global environment and create a drag on future economic competitiveness. Actions today that irreversibly degrade the environment, or impose such high remedial costs that degradation is 13. Let Them Eat Pollution, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66 (reproducing text of memo) [hereinafter Let Them Eat] . According to Summers, "the demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have very high income-elasticity."
14. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2056 . 15. Id. at 2057 . The memo referred to three theoretical reasons for dirty industries to migrate to developing countries: 1) pollution which impairs health should be done in the country which faces the lowest cost from health-impairing pollution, which will be the country with the lowest wages: "the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable .... ; 2) Initial increments of pollution have low cost and "under-populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted; their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low [sic] This argument is also relevant to certain environmental costs that must be met by the next generation. In the medium term of a generation or two, environmental protection affects the health of our children and grandchildren and the state of the environment that they will inherit. If we poison children today through contaminated water or air, these children will become the disabled workers and parents of tomorrow.
Even from a short-term perspective, the argument that the environment is only an amenity to be traded in the search for competitiveness can lead to later environmental damage that will in turn undermine competitiveness. Moreover, it can result in serious equity problems. The people who bear most of the cost of environmental harm, especially pollution, are frequently not at all the same people who will benefit most from the fruits of growth. On the contrary, the poor and disadvantaged often bear a disproportionate share of environmental costs, especially where there is little social mobility, as in most developing countries. It is they who are disproportionately exposed to toxic chemicals, breathe dirty air, drink polluted water, and are forced by poverty to exploit soils, forests, and other resources in an unsustainable manner. Meanwhile, the benefits of industrialization accrue disproportionately to the wealthy. On grounds of equity, then, environmental protection even in the short term ought to be viewed as important to sustainable long-term competitiveness.
9
As a practical matter, however, states are likely to regard consideration of many such intragenerational equity issues as a highly intrusive intervention into their domestic economies, and hence as an unwarranted extension of environmental law. International human rights law may offer an alternative approach for addressing the concerns of those adversely affected.
II. INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARDS AS A BASIS FOR PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVENESS
If we examine the topic of environmental regulation and competitiveness through the temporal lens of sustainable competitiveness, international standards play an important, albeit always limited, role. To address this issue, it is useful to distinguish transboundary environmental externalities that affect other countries, shared resources, or the global commons, from environmental externalities that take place primarily within a country. In addition, it is appropriate to focus separately on externalities at the firm level and to consider 19 . See CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ENVIRONMENT 56-58 (1993) (discussing intragenerational equity aspects of sustainable development). the environmental soundness of the life cycle of the production process, from the generation of resources to the disposal of the product.
This Part argues that international minimum standards are appropriate for a growing number of transboundary externalities, including those affecting the global commons, and that they may also be appropriate for certain serious externalities within countries. In addition, firms should implement the "polluter pays" principle as a step toward incorporating the full environmental costs of pollution control and resource use in the life cycle of the production process.
A. Transboundary Externalities
Environmentally sustainable development has become a criterion for evaluating all development efforts, whether in industrialized or in developing countries. 20 The approximately 850-page Agenda 21 adopted by countries at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development" begins to give detailed meaning to this criterion. It covers both transboundary and domestic externalities that have implications for environmentally sustainable development. The next step is for countries to formulate performance criteria, to assess both the state of the environment and the effectiveness of efforts to carry out the obligations in Agenda 21.
The previous discussion on the intergenerational dimension of competitiveness distinguished three temporal categories of environmental harm: long-term damage which is irreversible, or reversible at unacceptable cost; medium-term damage that affects our children and grandchildren or the ecosystem in ways that cannot be corrected with acceptable costs; and potentially short-term damage that can be contained with acceptable costs. Sustainable competitiveness requires that we develop international standards directed to the first two of these categories.
First, governments are increasingly negotiating international ambient, process, procedural, and product standards, which promote sustainable development. 22 The international environmental issues range from transboundary pollution, 23 27 and soils, 28 to movements of products and of fauna and flora. 29 In the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, for example, countries have agreed to phase out certain chemicals and to reduce consumption of others by given dates. 30 The general policy objective is that the ozone layer not be depleted by human-made chemicals. The obligation to phase out certain chemicals by given dates represents an international timedependent standard which implements the general policy. States in turn adopt national standards to implement the international chemical reduction standards, but they are free to adopt whatever approaches they find most suitable-such as bans, tax incentives, and tradeable permits. Nations are also free to adopt measures that would phase out the chemicals faster than required by the agreement and to phase out chemicals not even covered by the agreement.
3 '
Other international agreements establish procedural duties or standards which are intended to ensure sustainability. The recently concluded agreement on environmental impact assessment (EIA) under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), 32 for example, sets forth details on when EIA's are required and what information must be included in them. Similarly, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on Climate Change set forth parties' procedural obligations, such as to prepare national inventories of greenhouse emissions 3 3 or national biological diversity conservation plans, 34 which are intended to lead to planetary sustainability. In the latter 
1993]
The Yale Law Journal two agreements, at least, states have wide flexibility in the methods they use to implement the agreement. Recent developments in controlling air pollution under the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) explore both performance-and technology-based process standards. The new UN ECE Protocol on volatile organic compounds, for example, obligates countries to apply emissions standards based on best-available technologies that are economically feasible for stationary and mobile sources, which is a technology-based process standard. 35 The Protocol also obligates countries to reduce emissions by at least 30% of 1988 levels by the year 1999,36 which is a performance standard. 37 Negotiations are underway to revise the earlier protocol on sulfur dioxide emissions, 38 which provides simply for a 30% reduction in emissions or transboundary fluxes, to provide for more detailed obligations.
3 9 Ultimately, parties may seek to limit emissions to critical load levels, or threshold levels below which the pollutants pose no danger, 0 which would specify a single performance standard and provide flexibility in modes of implementation.
Stewart favors "harmonizing" international environmental standards that address transboundary externalities as in the climate change and ozone depletion conventions, but argues that reaching international agreements for environmental protection is a slow and tortuous process. 4 ' The record in the last twenty years indicates, to the contrary, that the international community has become very skilled at negotiating international environmental agreements. At the time of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, there were only about three dozen multilateral environmental agreements. In 1992, there were about 900 international legal instruments concerned with the environment, including important nonbinding instruments. 42 Within the last two-and-a-half years, there have been a dozen roughly contemporaneous negotiations of international environmental legal instruments. 4 47 The international community has shown a surprisingly steep learning curve in the negotiation of international environmental agreements. The challenge now is to bring the international agreements into effect and to ensure implementation and compliance at the national and subnational levels. While it took less than eighteen months to negotiate the Framework Convention on Climate, it routinely takes up to three years for agreements to go into effect. 4 In the future, it is likely that nonbinding legal instruments, 49 or what some jurists call "soft law," will increase because such instruments normally require less time to negotiate, can more easily be adapted to changes in scientific knowledge, and do not mandate a precise fit between the provisions in the instrument and national implementing measures. These nonbinding legal instruments are less likely to result in precise adherence to an international standard, but rather may lead to what the Europeans call "mutual recognition" of countries' standards and practices, in much the same way that the members of the European Community have moved to "mutual recognition" of members' environmental policies. 50 
B. Environmental Externalities Within Countries

The Empirical Evidence
Almost all countries have now adopted at least one piece of environmental legislation that controls the domestic production of environmental externalities. 2063-65, 2066-67, 2068 , he provides only a brief and incomplete account of the many benefits of environmental regulation that are hard to quantify and include in a benefitcost analysis. Id. at 2065-66. These include the robustness of ecosystems, environmental services such as buffering of climate and prevention of soil erosion, and diversity of fauna and flora. For an excellent report on the variety of benefits of environmental regulation, see CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES AT MIT, BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION, U.S. SENATE COMMITEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1980) . The authors classify the benefits of regulation into four categories: 1) lower costs of injury, disease, and aesthetic and other damage to natural resources and ecosystems; 2) higher productivity of workers, consumers, and natural systems such as forests, agricultural land, and wetlands; 3) development and adoption of new, more productive industrial processes and more effective products; and 4) improvements in society, such as the formation of new institutions or changes in income distribution. Id. at 6. The authors explore the difficulties in including all of these benefits in benefit assessments. Particularly since the beginning of 1991, the Mexican government has made significant efforts to enforce its standards on both new and existing sources and to publicize these efforts in an attempt to induce voluntary compliance by firms. Id. at 12-13, 48. Thus, if competitive advantage has arisen from differences in environmental standards, it has arisen primarily from differences in enforcement, not from the structure and content of the standards. But there is scant empirical evidence that U.S. industries have migrated to Mexico to take advantage of lax enforcement. See GAO STUDY, supra.
Yeats discerns a global dispersion of investments in dirty industries which is faster than that for clean industries, but the study concludes that this "is unlikely to be adequately explained by environmental policy." ' 54 In surveying the literature, Judith Dean concludes more broadly that
[m]ore stringent regulations in one country are thought to result in loss of competitiveness, and perhaps industrial flight and the development of pollution havens. The many empirical studies which have attempted to test these hypotheses have shown no evidence to support them. There may be room here for better estimates of actual environmental costs incurred by firms, and estimates by industry of actual losses in output due to these costs. It is doubtful that this would yield a significant impact on trade patterns. 5 Stewart acknowledges these and other studies but distrusts them for reasons he sets forth at length. He concludes that since many people argue that "U.S. industry is suffering as a result of disparities between relatively stringent U.S. regulatory standards and those of many of U.S. trading partners," it must be assumed to be so, unless empirical studies conclusively demonstrate otherwise. 6 This is an odd conclusion, for while doubts about the studies might cause Stewart to hesitate in accepting the proposition conclusively, such doubts by no means establish the opposite conclusion, particularly when there is a dearth of empirical evidence to support it. Stewart's analysis should lead him to be agnostic on the subject.
Since Stewart doubts the validity of studies that find no competitive effects from differences in national environmental regulations, it might follow that he would favor harmonizing standards in pursuit of a precautionary posture. But he reserves "harmonization" only for cases of transboundary externalities, and instead turns to voluntary contracts between governmental authorities and industries and to market-based incentives as a means to reduce the costs of environmental protection within countries.
7
Determining compliance levels is always difficult, in part because responsibility for enforcement normally is placed at multiple levels-national, regional, state, and local. For a comprehensive report on enforcement activities at several levels, see OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORTFY 1991 (Apr. 1992). In some countries, information on compliance tends to be scattered, incomplete, or otherwise difficult to obtain. At best, central reports may be available, but even then there may be considerable variation in the information provided about compliance by political subunits. This makes it difficult to determine the effects of the actual level of enforcement of environmental standards on competitiveness.
54 
C. The Case for International Minimum Standards
Assuming the studies are valid, if incomplete, and recognizing the potential for Stewart's two suggested approaches, there may still be reason to develop international standards for national externalities in certain circumstances. 8 As indicated previously, environmentally sustainable development is a global goal which all countries need to achieve. 9 While countries must be free to pursue their own development paths, there may be certain minimum levels of environmental protection and natural resource conservation which should shape the development process. Countries may wish to adopt more stringent environmental standards, which would be consistent with this approach. From the perspective of sustainable competitiveness, such minimum standards help to resolve the potential tension between competitiveness in the present and sustainable development which can form the foundation for competitiveness in future generations. Minimum standards also help to counter any adverse competitive effects from differences in environmental regulation and implementation, 60 and in this sense serve a precautionary function. The development of minimum standards is common to fields other than the environment as a way to ensure certain performance by targeted actors. For example, in banking, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has developed proposed minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their cross-border units to ensure that banks are subject to 61 m effective supervision. The minimum standards provide flexibility to countries in applying them to take account of different legal and structural conditions. 62 The development of international minimum standards may take several different forms: identical standards, mutual recognition of comparable standards, or even compatibility of standards based on the underlying objectives. There is precedent for each. Identical standards have been developed for procedures associated with the premanufacturing of products, 58. Conceptually, there are different kinds of standards: ambient, process, procedural, and product. Ambient standards are standards of environmental quality in the air, water, and other media. Process standards, including emissions standards for pollutants, govern the methods of production and the technologies used. Procedural or technical standards concern the testing of products, the gathering and evaluation of data, laboratory practices, etc. Product standards relate to the technical characteristics of the product. As indicated below, see infra text accompanying notes 63-70, a minimum standard can take different forms: identical, mutual recognition of comparable standards, and even compatibility with the policy objective.
59. such as for good laboratory practices. 63 The European Community is opting for mutual recognition of standards, rather than identical standards, for many environmental issues, 64 and the North American Free Trade Agreement provides for compatibility of standards. 65 International minimum standards differ from harmonized standards, in that they set only a baseline for judging behavior and allow countries or other targeted actors to exceed the minimum. The standards must be able to be adapted to respond to changes in scientific knowledge. In some cases, this will lead to stricter minimum standards; in others, such as in the recent case of dioxin, 66 to less strict standards.
In the U.S., the major national environmental legislation provides that states can adopt stricter standards than the national standard.
67 This is essential globally, for otherwise the international community would be forcing states to accept a dirty environment against their wishes, which would be a violation of national sovereignty and arguably of the polluting nation's duty to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause harm to areas outside their jurisdiction or control. 68 To some extent harmonization of national pollution standards is taking place through the private sector. Multinational companies are increasingly adopting the same environmental standards for their plants, regardless of the country in which they operate. 64. Giandomenico Majone notes that, in its White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the Commission of the European Community has proposed "a new approach to regulation which includes among its key elements the strategy of 'mutual recognition." ' Giandomenico Majone, Market Integration and Regulation: Europe After 1992, 43 METROECONOMICA 131, 140 (1992) . The White Paper has made a conceptual distinction between "matters where harmonization is essential and those where it is sufficient that there be mutual recognition of the equivalence of the various basic requirements laid down under national law." Id. at 141. Thus, they may be more likely to be in compliance with national environmental laws, or even to have stricter standards, because of the multinational company's need for efficiency of operations. 0 Intervention to promote a minimum standard is not necessarily appropriate and may in some circumstances be counterproductive. Below, I detail three criteria for determining when a minimum standard is appropriate: 1) whether we have sufficient experience with different standards to be able to develop a standard with confidence; 2) whether we will impose large costs on groups to comply with the standard, which might as effectively be spent on alternative approaches to the same end; and 3) whether we will mandate a choice of risk priorities for short-term harm rather than leaving it to the states to determine.
The Need for Experimentation
Communities are still experimenting with the best techniques for preventing and controlling pollution. The U.S. has moved from relying on common-law litigation to a mix of regulatory standards, including ambient standards, emissions limitations, and technology-based controls, and recently to market mechanisms. 7 Similarly, countries have moved from focusing only on conserving particular species to protecting habitats. 72 It may be premature in these circumstances to attempt to develop minimum international standards based on particular national environmental regulations among countries. While it would be possible to formulate minimum pollution control standards among countries in some cases, these standards must be flexible enough to accommodate both those who wish to adopt stricter standards and new scientific evidence which suggests there is no longer a need for a given standard.
The Need for Alternative Approaches
In some cases, large costs may be imposed on groups unnecessarily by certain forms of international minimum standards, unless we recognize that differences in local geographical conditions and social preferences may sometimes make alternative approaches to environmental control desirable. Different physical conditions-altitude, soil composition, rainfall patterns, 70. It is a separate question, however, whether individual plants actually implement these standards, and more importantly, whether the parent company actually sees to it that they are put into practice and maintained. In developing countries, with scarce resources to devote to enforcement, the companies that initially demonstrate standards higher than the national one may not be targeted for frequent enforcement visits. species distribution-and different infrastructures may also run counter to the formulation of certain kinds of minimum standards. 73
The Need to Prioritize Risks
All countries need to prioritize their environmental risks. Certain environmental risks occur mainly at the national and subnational levels, and have only marginal international effects, whether on the environment or on economic competition. These may include, for example, noise pollution, pollution of specific ground water aquifers, and certain kinds of air and surface water pollution. In these instances there may be little reason to try to establish international minimum standards, unless there are particular groups or ecosystems of interest to the international community that are suffering particularized damage.
D. Nongovernmental Sources of Minimum Standards
While governments are perceived as the usual route for developing international minimum standards, there are also other important sources, including corporations, industrial associations, and professional societies. Because of the rapid advance in and dissemination of new technologies, common environmentally sound practices may emerge within industries. Informal discussions with industry representatives have suggested that as companies become global operators, they are driven for reasons of economic efficiency to adopt relatively comparable standards among themselves.
7 '
Industrial associations and other nongovernmental fora are also increasingly developing common environmental guidelines for particular industries or for particular operations. 7 5 While these are usually quite general in character, they do contribute to the emergence of a minimum standard of environmentally responsible behavior. Finally, professional societies also engage in setting common international environmental standards. For example, when molecular biologists became concerned about the risk of environmental damage from DNA research, they issued research guidelines, which they later modified in 73. For example, in the U.S., particulates are ambient air pollutants that are regulated by State Implementation Plans, which differ among states and allow for variation at the local level to accommodate local concerns and needs. response to new risk assessments that indicated that the dangers were not as serious as they had thought. 76 These guidelines of the scientists subsequently formed the basis of governmental regulations.
In such cases, efforts by governments to formalize minimum standards may be unnecessary, 77 or even counterproductive depending upon what form the standard takes. In order for this phenomenon to result in effective environmental protection, however, the market needs to account for the full environmental costs that it does not yet reflect, such as those to future generations.
E. Sustainable Competitiveness in the Life Cycle of the Production Process
Stewart does not distinguish between the competitiveness of nations and the competitiveness of firms. Many of his arguments, such as the need for international harmonization of environmental standards on greenhouse gas emissions, conservation of biological diversity, transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, ozone depletion and endangered species 7 " are addressed to protecting national competitiveness and not the competitiveness of firms. Other arguments, such as the burden on U.S. firms of national environmental regulations, are addressed to the international competitiveness of these firms. But the distinction is crucial, for the factors that affect competitiveness in the two situations are different.
79
At the firm level, sustainable competitiveness draws attention to the environmental soundness of the whole life cycle of the production process. Processes of resource extraction and use, of production, and of product disposal are all relevant. Trade competitiveness will be increasingly based on the competitiveness of the life cycle of the production process, just as environmental sustainability rests in important part on the soundness of the life cycle of the production process for the environment.
The international community has long been concerned with the externalities firms impose on the environment. In 1974, the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted the polluter pays principle, which provides that "the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the measures [necessary] to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state." 80 Command-and-control regulations 76. Compare Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium, 187 SCIENCE 931 (Mar. 14, 1975) , with Warren E. Leary, U.S. Set to Relax Guidelines for Gene-Splitting Research, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1978 , at Cl. 77. See GORE, supra note 7, at 192-95 (1992 (discussing creative responses of industry to environmental pollution).
78. Stewart, supra note 8, at 2099-2100.
79.
See supra note 5 (discussing "national competitiveness"). 80. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Council Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, Nov. 14, 1974 , OECD Doc. C(74)223, 14 I.L.M. 234 (1975 . [Vol. 102: 2123 Environmental Regulation or economic incentives that promote implementation of the polluter pays principle promote environmentally sustainable development, insofar as they force firms to internalize the costs of environmental externalities.
III. MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES AS A PROMISING BUT UNTESTED APPROACH TO SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
While nations use a variety of instruments to protect the environment, command-and-control regulations are arguably the most widespread. Ernst Ulrich von Weiziicker?' and others have argued that command-and-control regulation is a highly inefficient and burdensome method of environmental protection, and that economic instruments such as taxes would be superior. Whatever the merits of the argument for taxes, command-and-control regulations have changed behavior. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann notes that "[t]he theory of public choice teaches that political choices among alternative policy instruments may be determined more by the self-interests of organized groups and of politicians than by the economic objective of maximizing national economic welfare through efficient policy instruments. ' 2 He concludes that those who produce pollution and those who are concerned with labor, environmental protection, and exports may prefer command-and-control regulations to other economic instruments. 3 Stewart argues that the administrative costs of command-and-control regulations are so burdensome that they affect competitiveness, at least in the U.S., and pleads for marketbased incentives to implement environmental policies. ' The economic instruments discussed by Professor Stewart promise important advantages in that they should create incentives for industry to develop and apply innovative, lower-cost measures to minimize environmental degradation. One of the instruments that he focuses on is transferable pollution permits. 85 As of this writing, transferable permits are promising but still essentially untried. While they are attractive because they can, in principle, minimize administrative costs, they are not free of such costs. In addition, they require certain conditions to be effective: easy access by participants to good information about the emissions credit market, physical models of the environment that make emissions permits easy to calculate reliably, a regulatory process that can approve or register applications quickly, effective means of monitoring compliance with emissions permits, and a reliable system STATES 198, 201-206 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990 for monitoring emissions levels, especially in geographical areas where elevated levels may pose health and other environmental risks. 86 Tradeable pollution permits address the question of efficiency of environmental regulation. They do not address the question of equity. The basis for allocating emissions permits can be highly controversial, particularly if the scheme were to be applied between countries. Moreover, once the initial market allocations have been made, it may be politically difficult for the government to decrease overall emissions in response to new scientific information unless the permits have been issued for a limited time period.
UNITED
The U.S. first experimented with emissions trading programs in 1979, when it allowed a plant operating under emissions limitations to increase emissions at one point in the plant if it decreased emissions at another. This was known as the "bubble policy," because a plant could create a theoretical dome over itself and have only the aggregate amount of emissions from the dome considered, rather than the emissions from the individual sources within the dome or bubble. In 1986 the U.S. developed a more comprehensive Emissions Trading Policy. 87 This policy included three aspects: bubbling, 88 netting (trade between a new source and an existing source within a plant), 89 and offsetting (increases from new sources offset by reductions in other existing sources in area).
9 0 The Policy also permitted companies to "bank" emission credits for later use. In 1989, Hahn and Hester found in reviewing the limited experience with the Emissions Trading Policy that companies had used the system only infrequently, particularly the provisions for banking and trading emissions between firms, despite the economic benefits that the system was designed to create. 9 ' The study revealed that the uncertainties in calculating baselines and in determining which reductions could be used to establish emissions credits had created uncertainty about the property rights created by the emissions credit system. 92 Moreover, it was difficult to find willing sellers, and no market information was available for use in anticipating § 52 (1987) . 89. By using netting, a plant could be exempted from some of the preconstruction review process requirements for new stationary sources, which can mean significant savings. Id.
90. Offsets are required in areas where ambient air quality standards are not being met or are in danger of being exceeded. If the new source is an area where ambient standards are not being met and there is no plan approved for attaining the ambient air quality standards, the offset must result in at least a 20% reduction of pollution from the baseline level of emissions. Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3274-76 (1979) the future price of credits. 93 In addition, transaction costs were high in obtaining regulatory approval for an emissions trade.
94
The newest experiment with emissions trading in the U.S. is the proposed sulfur dioxide trading system under the Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990,95 which sets up unit accounts for emissions of sulfur dioxide and allows banking and trading of allowances between units. 96 The system is designed to reduce some of the problems encountered earlier, 97 particularly through streamlined trading procedures and reliable information on potential sources of S02 allowances. Even so, the system depends on an effective regulatory infrastructure that can monitor emissions, determine compliance, and penalize noncompliance. In this sense, the sulfur dioxide system builds upon the last twenty years of environmental regulation; it does not supplant it. As with any new instrument, it will be important to monitor experience with transferable pollution permits to be sure that they lead to effective and more efficient environmental protection and contribute to sustainable competitiveness.
CONCLUSION
Stewart's focus is on the effect of environmental regulations on competitiveness today, and to a lesser extent, in the past. But it is essential to extend our focus forward, to the future, to sustainable competitiveness, which is inherently intergenerational. If we adopt this lens, then the treatment of the environment today becomes the basis upon which future production rests. 93 . Id. 94. The authors note that "the federal-approved process for bubbles is much more costly and lengthy than for many state-approved emissions trading activities, thereby creating a great incentive for firms to use forms of emissions trading under state control-generic bubble, netting, and offsets." Id. at 140-41.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (Supp. II 1990). 96. Section 403(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a), requires the Environmental Protection Agency to allocate SO 2 emission allowances for each unit covered by the statute in an amount equal to the statutory SO 2 emission limits, provided that no more than 8.95 million allowances are allocated annually after January 1, 2000. Section 403(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b), authorizes the transfer of these allowances between units. Under the proposed rules, for every affected unit, EPA will establish SO 2 emission allowance accounts, which will be divided into 30 subaccounts for the current year and each subsequent year for thirty years. At the end of every year, the subaccount for that year is closed and a new subaccount opened for the 30th year from the current year. A unit may keep these allowances in each subaccount or may trade them in advance. If a unit has unused emission allowances at the end of the subaccount period, they are "banked" into the next year's account and available for use or for trading with other units. The EPA has proposed that industries make transfers by submitting a request to record the transfer of allowances, with each allowance having its own tracking number. All information in the Allowance Tracking System would be publicly available, eventually through a system that permits electronic access to the data. Efforts already underway at the Chicago Board of Trade and other exchanges could lead to the development of allowance-based financial exchanges that would service futures and spot markets for emissions allowances. See Acid Rain Allowance Allocation and Reserves, 40 C.F.R. § § 72, 73, 75 (1993) The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 102: 2123 In the context of nations, sustainable competitiveness requires the present generation to internalize both present and future costs of production and to develop minimum standards of environmental protection, especially for transboundary externalities. At the firm level, it requires attention to the full life cycle of the production process and implementation of the polluter pays principle. Whatever instruments we may develop to make the protection of the environment more efficient must be critically reviewed to ensure that they will in practice protect the interests of future generations as well as ourselves in environmentally sustainable development-and in sustainable competitiveness.
